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UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE: HEALTH
CARE REFORM, PREEMPTION, LABELING CLAIMS
AND UNPAID INTERNS: THE LATEST BATTLES
IN FOOD LAW
A. Bryan Endres,* Nicholas R. Johnson~ & Michaela N. Tarr
This edition of the Food Law Update explores four legal issues
arising in the first half of 2010 reflective of the diverse nature of the
food law specialist. As the national debate surrounding the merits
of health care reform dominated the legislative agenda, this article
first will discuss the food labeling rules embedded within section
4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.'
The authors then analyze the preemptive reach of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Meat Inspection Act with respect to
three separate California statutes regarding animal welfare stan-
dards, retail labels on meat packages and state-based mislabeling
claims for "natural" products. Section three further discusses litiga-
tion concerning allegedly misleading label claims of health benefits,
nutritional composition, natural foods and Country-of-Origin. The
final section of this Update explores an increasingly important legal
issue common in the local foods/small scale production content-
the use of unpaid "interns" as labor and potential changes in regula-
tory oversight.
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1. Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152 (2010).
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As in previous editions of this update, necessity dictates that
not every change is included; rather, the authors have limited their
analysis to significant changes within the broader context of food
production, distribution, and retail. The intent behind this series of
updates is to provide a starting point for scholars, practitioners,
food scientists, and policymakers dedicated to understanding the
shaping of food law in modem society. Tracing the development of
food law through these updates also builds an important historical
context for the overall development of the discipline.
I. HEALTH CARE REFORM AND FOOD LAW: Do WE REALLY WANT TO
KNow How MANY CALORIES ARE IN A HARDEE'S THICKBURGER@?
One Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty. That's the num-
ber of calories in a Hardee's 2/3 pound Monster Thickburger@.' Of
course, a consumer confronted with this staggering number could
opt for the Original Thickburger@, which, at a mere 860 calories,
seems positively healthful by comparison.' And a one-calorie Diet
Coke, of course.' But do consumers really want to know how many
calories are in their fast food? Apparently there is a compelling
health rationale,' and thus the much-maligned health care reform
law included a little-known provision mandating the nutrition label-
ing of chain restaurant standard menu items such as the Thick-
burger@.' This represents one of the first forays by the federal gov-
ernment into nutrition labeling in the food away from home sector.
Previous federal nutrition labeling requirements exempted food
sold at restaurants,' and only recently have state and local govern-
2. See Nutrition Information, HARDEES.cOM, http://www.hardees.com/system/
pdf menus/9/original/HardeesNutritionals_5.20.10.pdf 1285096241 (last visited
Dec. 20, 2010).
3. Id.
4. See Calories in Diet Coke, CALORIECOuNT.ABOuT.coM, http://
caloriecount.about.com/calories-coca-cola-diet-coke-i98053 (last visited Nov. 22,
2010).
5. See Disclosure of Nutrient Content Information for Standard Menu Items
Offered for Sale at Chain Restaurants or Similar Retail Food Establishments and for
Articles of Food Sold From Vending Machines, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,026 (July 7, 2010)
(stating that "nutritional information through menu labeling would provide Ameri-
cans the opportunity to exercise personal responsibility and make informed choices
about their diets" and citing studies that providing nutrition information assists
customers in making healthier eating decisions at restaurants).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H) (2006).
7. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(1) (2006) (exempting restaurants from the gen-
eral nutrition labeling requirements).
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ments, on an ad hoc basis, required restaurants to provide some
form of nutritional information on their menus.' For example, as
of May 2008, New York City requires calorie displays on menus of
chain restaurants with over 15 locations nationwide.' California en-
acted a similar bill with state-wide implementation effective January
1, 2011.
The amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act require
chain restaurants, defined as a restaurant with twenty or more loca-
tions operating under the same name and offering substantially the
same menu items, to disclose the number of calories and a state-
ment indicating the suggested daily caloric intake." The calorie dis-
closure must be on the printed menu and menu board (including a
drive-through menu board). In addition, restaurants must provide
customers, upon request, printed information regarding calories,
total fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sodium, total carbohydrates,
complex carbohydrates, sugars, fiber, and total protein"-in sum, the
nutrition information generally required on packaged food prod-
ucts." A similar rule applies to individuals owning or operating
twenty or more vending machines." In this case, the vending ma-
chine operator must provide a sign in close proximity to the selec-
tion button for each item that discloses the caloric content.
On July 7, 2010, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) so-
licited comments to help guide the development of implementing
regulations. 7 The agency specifically requested information on cur-
8. See generally, CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, COMPARISON OF
MENU LABELING POLICIES, available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/comparison
of mlpolicies_6-9.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
9. 24 RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 81.50. For a more thorough discussion
of the New York City regulation and accompanying legal challenges to the menu
labeling requirements, see A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update, Consumer
Protections and Access to Information rBST, BPA, the ADA and Color Additives, 4 J.
FOOD L. & POL'Y 263, 291-293 (2008).
10. See S.B. 1420 (Cal. 2008) (codified at section 114094 of the California Health
and Safety Code).




14. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1)(C) and (D) (2006).
. 15. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573 (2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(q)(5)(H)(viii).
16. Id.
17. See Disclosure of Nutrient Content Information for Standard Menu Items
Offered for Sale at Chain Restaurants or Similar Retail Food Establishments and for
Articles of Food Sold From Vending Machines, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,026 (July 7, 2010).
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rent menu board labeling practices, methodologies for considera-
tions related to condiments and custom orders, and any other fac-
tors deemed relevant by the public. Although this action repre-
sents a potentially controversial first step into greater federal over-
sight of nutrition in the restaurant industry, the FDA noted that due
to the proliferation of state and local menu board labeling require-
ments, several stakeholders sought a national approach to ensure
uniformity and flexibility in the provision of additional nutrition
information. Of course, the final FDA rules, due no later than
March 23, 2011, will determine if these stakeholders get what they
bargained for, and it remains to be seen whether calorie disclosures
will entice consumers to switch from the Thickburger@ to more
modest offerings.
II. CALIFORNIA PREEMPTION ACTIONS
In several respects, California is the prototypical laboratory for
the exploration of alternative regulatory regimes." Most notably,
the Clean Air Act provides a mechanism for California to establish
vehicle emissions standards beyond the federal minimum.' Within
the food context, California was among the early leaders in estab-
lishing production standards for organic foods.' Not surprisingly,
California is a leader in developing novel animal welfare and label-
ing requirements. Likewise, it is not surprising that a host of litiga-
18. Id. at 39,027-28.
19. Public Law 111-148 requires the agency to issue proposed regulations im-
plementing the restaurant labeling rules no later than March 23, 2011. Id. at
39,027.
20. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("One of federalism's chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by
allowing for the possibility that 'a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country.'") (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 282 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
21. See California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of
Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's 2009 and
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehi-
cles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006) (gener-
ally prohibiting states from implementing emission controls standards); id. at §
7543(b)(1) (providing a waiver provision that allows states adopt emissions control
standards if certain criteria are met).
22. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26569.13 (1979) (repealed 1990). See also A.
Bryan Endres, An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics Industry: Coming to Terms with
Big Organics and Other Legal Challenges for the Industry's Next Ten Years, 12 DRAKE J.
AGRic. L. 17, 19 (2007) (discussing early state organic certification laws).
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tion follows passage of these new production requirements. The
following section discusses two key preemption decisions in the fed-
eral and state courts of appeal regarding slaughter of "downer"
animals and point-of-sale labels on meat products. Within the con-
text of preemption, this section further analyzes a third federal dis-
trict court case exploring the interplay between the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and misbranding claims brought under
California law.
A. California Animal Rights Law Survives Preemption Challenge
before the Ninth Circuit
A major piece of California legislation aimed at the humane
treatment of non-ambulatory or "downer"" animals at slaughter-
houses has, for the most part, survived a preemption challenge by
meat industry groups. In March, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held in National Meat Association v. Brown" that the Federal
Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) does not preempt certain provisions of
the California Penal Code that prescribed criminal penalties for
stockyards and slaughterhouses that receive and process non-
"downer" animals for slaughter.
The case comes on the heels of considerable controversy. In
2008, the Humane Society of the United States released a video of
non-ambulatory cows at California slaughterhouses being kicked,
electrocuted, and dragged with chains, as well as other flagrant
abuse.2 ' The video triggered the largest beef recall in United States
history." In response, the California legislature amended §599f of
its penal code to (1) prohibit slaughterhouses and stockyards from
buying, selling, receiving, or processing non-ambulatory animals; (2)
prohibit slaughterhouses and stockyards from butchering, process-
ing, or selling meat from non-ambulatory animals for human con-
sumption, and (3) prohibit slaughterhouses from holding non-
ambulatory animals without taking "immediate action to humanely
euthanize the animal."2 In response to video footage showing im-
mobile cows being rammed with bulldozers and blasted through the
nostrils with high-pressure water hoses, the amendments also stipu-
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(j) (West 2010) (defining "non-ambulatory" as
being "unable to stand and walk without assistance").
24. 599 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2010).
25. Id. at 1096.
26. Id.
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(c) (West 2010). See also Brown, 599 F.3d at 1096.
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lated humane handling methods for moving non-ambulatory ani-
mals."
Shortly before the Act's newly amended provisions were to take
effect, the National Meat Association (NMA) filed suit in federal
district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.' The district
court held that the FMIA preempted the California law and entered
a preliminary injunction; the State of California, along with the
Humane Society and several other animal rights organizations, filed
an interlocutory appeal."
On appeal, the NMA argued that FMIA's specific provisions
dealing with non-ambulatory animals preempted California's new
law. Specifically, 21 U.S.C. § 603(a) requires federal inspection of all
animals capable of being sold into interstate commerce as meat for
human consumption.3 ' Federal regulations require that any animals
identified as non-ambulatory during these inspections be classified
as "U.S. Suspect" and held for further examination;32 if further in-
spection reveals certain diseases, then the animal must be disposed
of.33 If, however, the animal passes this second-level inspection, it
may be slaughtered and distributed for human consumption." The
FMIA contains a general preemption provision prohibiting states
from prescribing additional or differing requirements "with respect
to premises, facilities, and operations of any establishment at which
inspection is provided."'
Focusing carefully on the express preemption clause of the
FMIA, the Court of Appeals rejected NMA's arguments. It reasoned
that while the clause preempted laws that dealt with "premises, fa-
cilities, and operations" of slaughterhouses, the California provi-
sions simply regulated the types of animals that can and cannot be
slaughtered in California slaughterhouses." As the California provi-
sions "[do not] require any additional or different inspections than
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f(e) (West 2010) ("[A] non-ambulatory animal may
not be dragged at any time, or pushed with equipment at any time, but shall be
moved with a sling or on a stoneboat or other sled-like or wheeled conveyance.").
29. Brown, 599 F.3d at 1096.
30. Id. at 1097.
31. Id.
32. 9 C.F.R. § 309.2(b) (2010). See also Brown, 599 F.3d at 1097.
33. 9 C.F.R. §§ 309.4-309.18. See also Brown, 599 F.3d at 1097.
34. 9 C.F.R. § 309.2. See also Brown, 599 F.3d at 1097-98.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2006). See also Brown, 599 F.3d at 1098.
36. Brown, 599 F.3d at 1098. See also Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551
(7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the FMIA does not preempt state law banning horse
slaughter); Empacadora de Carnes de Fresillo v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2007)
(same).
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does the FMIA, [it] is thus not a regulation of the 'premises, facili-
ties, and operations' of slaughterhouses." On the issue of implied
conflicts preemption, the court noted that it is not impossible to
comply with both sets of regulations at once because the FMIA does
not require that non-ambulatory animals be slaughtered for human
consumption.' Instead, said the court, the FMIA's inspection pro-
cedures apply if an animal is to be slaughtered for human consump-
tion; the question of whether certain animals should be slaughtered
"is up to the states.""
While the bulk of the California provisions survived a preemp-
tion analysis, the court suggested in dicta that the humane handling
provision of the California law would not survive a preemption chal-
lenge because it prescribed "additional" or "different" requirements
that would be in conflict with federal law (in particular, the federal
law allows the dragging of unconscious non-ambulatory animals,
whereas the state law does not)."0 But because the district court had
failed to make the requisite findings of likelihood of irreparable in-
jury and balance of the equities needed to justify a preliminary in-
junction, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order in
its entirety."
The Brown decision has broader significance within the context
of the continuing controversy surrounding California's recent push
for more robust animal welfare laws. In 2008, California voters
passed the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act - popularly
known as Proposition 2 - which prohibits the confinement of cer-
tain animals (including chickens, veal calves, and sows) in ways that
do not allow the animals to extend their limbs or otherwise roam
freely about.2 Though the new provisions are not scheduled to take
effect until 2015, considerable confusion already exists as to prohib-
ited activities and enforcement methodologies. In July 2010, ani-
37. Brown, 599 F.3d at 1099.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1099-1100.
40. Id. at 1101.
41. Id.
42. Prop 2 Wins in California!, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Nov. 5, 2008),
http://aldf.org/article.php?id=757; Text of Proposed Laws, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE,
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-
proposed-laws.pdf#prop2 (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
43. One of the largest California egg producers, J.S. West, recently spent $3.2
million upgrading to larger, air-conditioned chicken cages furnished with such
luxuries as hen-style nail files. J.S. West company president Eric Benson told the
Wall Street Journal in August that the cages "go way beyond" Proposition 2 require-
ments. Jean Guerrero, Cracking California's Egg Rules, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2010),
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mal rights activists and California legislators united behind a new
law, pushed through the California Assembly as A.B. 1437, which
bans all out-of-state eggs that do not comply with Proposition 2 re-
quirements." So despite the recent partial victory for animal rights
activists in Brown, litigation over animal welfare will surely continue:
The protectionist language in A.B. 1437 leaves the law susceptible to
a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, and the National Meat As-
sociation will likely continue to pursue its challenge of the California
Penal Code's humane handling methods, using the Ninth Circuit's
dicta as substantial leverage.
B. FMIA Preemption of State Point-of-Sale Warnings on Meat Products
In a case decided in late 2009, a California state court of ap-
peals examined the terms "label" and "labeling" as used in the Fed-
eral Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and concluded that the federal law
preempts state law requirements pertaining to "point-of-sale" warn-
ings on meat products.
The case, American Meat Institute v. Leeman," involved imple-
mentation of the California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic En-
forcement Act of 1986 (commonly known as Proposition 65) and
the FMIA's meat labeling requirements. Proposition 65 requires the
state to maintain a list of all chemicals known to cause cancer or
reproductive toxicity and requires retailers to warn consumers about
products sold in their stores that contain such chemicals." One of
the ways a retailer may give warning is via "point-of-sale" notices -
that is, signs or advertisements placed on or near the display case or
shelf where a product is offered for sale but not actually placed onto
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703908704575433881581660408
.html. Nonetheless, the move drew criticism from the Humane Society, which has
consistently maintained that the only way to comply with Proposition 2 require-
ments is to raise chickens in cage-free environments. Id. Association of California
Egg Farmers Executive Director Debbie Murdock, whose organization has called for
clearer standards, summed up her position on the law for the Wall Street Journal:
"'Who knows what the law states.'" Id.
44. Jim Miller, Bill Would Apply Caged Hen Rules To Out-Of-State Eggs, THE PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (May 11, 2009), http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE
NewsLocal_S-eggsll.4644e80.html; Press Release, Humane Society of the United
States, Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark Egg Bill Into Law (July 6, 2010),
available at http-://www.humanesociety.org/news/press-releases/2010/0 7/abl437_
passage_070610.htmL
45. 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759, 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), review denied, No. S179937
2010 WL 1088008 (Cal. 2010).
46. Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 763.
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the packaging itself." To be in compliance with Proposition 65 re-
quirements, the point-of-sale sign must clearly state that the particu-
lar meat product on display contains a chemical known to the state
to cause cancer and/or cause birth defects or other reproductive
harm.
At the federal level, the USDA has implemented a detailed
regulatory scheme for meat labeling. 9 These regulations provide
generally that "no final labeling shall be used on any product unless
the sketch labeling of such final labeling has been submitted for ap-
proval" to the applicable regulatory agency.50 Furthermore, the
FMIA contains an express preemption clause that prohibits states
from enacting "marking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient re-
quirements in addition to, or different than" those contained in the
FMIA.' The FMIA also defines "labeling" as "all labels and other
written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or its con-
tainer or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article." Accord-
ingly, the plaintiffs argued that point-of-sale warnings constituted
"labeling" under the FMIA because they constitute "written, printed
or graphic matter" that accompany the meat to which it relates." The
trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and the
appeals court affirmed, holding that the FMIA expressly preempted
Proposition 65's labeling requirements as applied to meat prod-
ucts.
On appeal, the central question for the court was whether warn-
ings that accompany meat products constitute "labeling" within the
scope of the FMIA. Because the FMIA does not define specifically
the word "accompany," the court turned to U.S. Supreme Court
precedent for its analysis. In Kordel v. United States,"5 the Court in-
terpreted the word "labeling" within the context of the FDCA.
Critically, the Court held that certain material "accompanies" a
product - and therefore constitutes "product labeling" - if the mate-
47. Id. at 763-64.
48. Id. at 764. See also People ex. rel. Lundgren v. Cotter & Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
368, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("[A] merchant can comply with Proposition 65 by
posting a sign stating that the products are known to the state to cause cancer
and/or are reproductively toxic.").
49. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 317.1-317.400 (2010); Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 765.
50. 9 C.F.R. § 317.4(a); Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 765.
51. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2006). See also Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 765.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 601(p). See also Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 775-76.
53. Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 776.
54. Id. at 767, 785.
55. 335 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1948).
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rial "supplements or explains [the product]...No physical attachment
one to the other is necessary."5 6 The Court further held that mate-
rial constitutes "labeling" if it is "designed for use in the distribution
and sale" of the product."
The Leeman court expressly adopted the Kordel Court's defini-
tion of "labeling" for purposes of its FMIA analysis, noting that
Congress had defined the word "labeling" in the FMIA by borrow-
ing the FDCA's definition of that word (as interpreted by Kordel)."
With that work done, the Leeman court's express preemption analy-
sis is straightforward: It concludes that the purpose of Proposition
65 warnings was to communicate to consumers that this particular
piece of meat contains carcinogens or reproductive toxins, and that
point-of-sale warning signs containing this product-specific informa-
tion, though not physically attached to the product, necessarily will
"supplement or explain the meat offered for sale" and will be used
"in the distribution and sale" of the product.55  Accordingly, the
court held that the point-of-sale warnings constituted "labeling"
within the meaning of the FMIA preemption clause.
Though decided by a state court, the Leeman case nonetheless
deserves an extended mention in this Update because of the court's
comprehensive search for the meaning of the terms "label" and "la-
beling" as used in the FMIA. In addition to examining the USDA's
own interpretation of the terms in various policy memorandums
and informal guidance, the court reviewed caselaw interpreting the
terms as used in statutes with similar wording - namely, the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act. This thorough search for meaning may
well guide other courts (including federal ones) in future labeling
litigation.
C. FDCA Does Not Preempt State Law-Based Mislabeling Claims
A California federal district court ruled in June 2010 that the
express preemption provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) did not preempt suits brought under state law
for false or misleading product labels. In Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural
Beverage Co."-a class action suit brought on behalf of consumers
56. Leeman, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 778 (quoting Korde 335 U.S. at 350).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 781-82.
59. Id. at 784-85.
60. 268 F.R.D. 365 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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allegedly deceived by the packaging and labeling on Blue Sky bever-
age cans-the plaintiffs argued the labels implied that the soda was
canned in New Mexico, when in fact it was not." The plaintiffs al-
leged violations of the California Business and Professional Code
and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, as well as common law
claims of fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.' The defendants
argued that the FDCA preempted the claims.
On the issue of express preemption, the Chavez court noted
that although the FDCA includes a preemption clause (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)) that lists certain provisions expressly preempt-
ing state law, the relevant section addressing "false or misleading
labeling" was not among them." The crux of the defendants' im-
plied preemption analysis revolved around § 337(a) of the FDCA,
which provides that only the federal government and the States (and
not private citizens) may bring civil enforcement proceedings for
violations of the FDCA.' The defendants argued that this provision
effectively committed enforcement to the FDA, to the exclusion of
state consumer law claims; the defendants also argued that such
claims would stymie the purpose of the FDCA (ostensibly, consistent
enforcement of food labeling requirements)." The Chavez court
brushed off these arguments, holding that the lack of an FDCA ex-
press preemption clause addressing false and misleading labeling
demonstrated that Congress had no "clear and manifest" intent to
occupy the entire field of food labeling." The court also cited to the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Wyeth v. Levine," in which the
Court stated that while Congress enacted the FDCA "to bolster con-
sumer protection against harmful products," it did not provide a
federal cause of action for consumers injured by those products be-
cause it determined that "widely available state rights of action pro-
vided appropriate relief for injured consumers."'
In holding that the FDCA does not preempt state law remedies
for false and misleading packaging claims, the Chavez court falls in
line with several other district courts in California that have recently
61. Id. at 368.
62. Id. at 369.
63. Id. at 370.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006); Chavez, 268 F.R.D. at 371.
65. Chavez, 268 F.R.D. at 371-73.
66. Id. at 372.
67. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
68. Chavez, 268 F.R.D. at 373 (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199).
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held that the FDCA does not preempt state claims for allegedly false
and misleading "natural" labels."
III. OTHER LABELING ACTIONS
According to a nationwide study published by the FDA in
March 2010, more than 50% of consumers read the food label on a
product the first time they purchase it." The FDA study also found
that 56% of those surveyed believe that "only some" or "none" of
the nutrient claims found on food labels (e.g., "low fat" or "high in
fiber") are accurate."
However, consumers are not the only ones casting a critical eye
toward health-related food labels. In February 2010, the FDA issued
warning letters to 17 companies." Though these warning letters
specifically targeted certain health claims (for example, 0 g trans fat
claims, or nutrient content claims on food or beverages marketed to
children under the age of 2), the FDA also issued an open letter to
the food industry indicating that the agency would step up general
enforcement of labeling violations." Parallel consumer lawsuits
against some of the companies singled out by the FDA (as discussed
below) have already commenced.
This consumer skepticism and heightened agency attention may
be, at least in part, what is driving the recent spate of lawsuits alleg-
ing that food manufacturers are misleading the public as to the pur-
ported health benefits of their products. This section of the Update
divides the discussion of these labeling claims into four separate
sections: false health claims, mislabeled and misbranded products,
69. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Con-Agra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (N.D. Cal.
2009); Wright v. General Mills, No. 08CV1532, 2009 WL 3247148 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
30, 2009); Hitt v. Arizona Bev. Co., No. 08CV809, 2009 WL 449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb.
4, 2009).
70. Conrad J. Choiniere & Amy Lando, 2008 Health and Diet Survey, U.S. FOOD
AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/
ConsumerResearch/ucml93895#HEALTHATTITUDES (last visited Nov. 18,
2010).
71. Id.
72. Warning Letters, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm202859.htm. See also Brad
Dorfman and Susan Heavey, U.S. Warns Nestle, Others For Misleading Food Claims,
REUTERS, Mar. 3, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN03386
5520100303?pageNumber-l
73. Open Letter from Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r of Food and Drugs, U.S.
Food and Drug Admin., to Industry (Mar. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm202733.htm.
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"natural" products litigation, and country-of-origin labeling (COOL)
actions.
A. False Health Claims Litigation
1. Yo-Plus Probiotic Yogurt
Fitzpatrick v. General Mills,' which challenges the health claims
made as to Yoplait Yo-Plus yogurt, is a typical example of the health
claims litigation now pending in courtrooms across the country.
In July 2007, General Mills began selling Yoplait Yo-Plus yogurt,
which is a version of its regular yogurt supplemented with probiotic
bacteria and vitamins that purportedly promote digestive tract
health.7 ' General Mills subsequently launched a marketing blitz that
touted the "key benefit of digestive health" offered by Yo-Plus yo-
gurt.' Marketing tactics included a multimedia advertising cam-
paign, promotional materials sent to health professionals, and
health claims on Yo-Plus packaging. The marketing emphasized
regular consumption of the probiotic yogurt as essential to health.
Indeed, up until September 2008 Yo-Plus containers contained a
statement that implored consumers to "[e]at Yo-Plus every day to
help maintain a balance of good-for-you bacteria in your digestive
system and regulate digestive health."7
In August 2009, Florida consumer Julie Fitzpatrick filed a puta-
tive class action in Florida federal district court alleging that she had
been deceived by General Mills' health claims on Yo-Plus yogurt.
The suit, which alleges violations of the Florida Deceptive and Un-
fair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) and a common law claim for
breach of express warranty, states that the plaintiff ate Yo-Plus yo-
gurt over a 12-month period, but that her digestive tract health re-
mained the same "before, during and after" eating the yogurt.
In early January, the district court certified a class of "all per-
sons who purchased Yo-Plus in the state of Florida to obtain its
claimed digestive health benefit."' The court held that issues com-
mon to the class of potentially thousands of members predominated
74. 263 F.R.D. 687 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
75. Id. at 690.
76. Id. at 691.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Fitzpatick, 263 F.R.D. at 692.
80. Id. at 698.
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over individual issues, with the main one being whether the Yo-Plus
marketing campaign was deceptive and misleading. As the court put
it:
General Mills cannot evade the unmistakable fact that the objective -
and realization - of its marketing campaign was to present Yo-Plus to
Florida consumers as a product that . . . aids in the promotion of diges-
tive health. The Court is not persuaded that the bulk of Florida con-
sumers made the decision to purchase Yo-Plus, which is priced signifi-
cantly higher than regular Yoplait yogurt, for reasons unrelated to its
purported digestive health benefits. Indeed, the most obvious reason
why consumers would buy Yo-Plus is that it promises something extra,
and that something extra is a digestive health benefit."'
As of this writing, an interlocutory appeal by General Mills is pend-
ing with the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Spurred on by the successful class certification in Fitzpatrick,
other plaintiffs have subsequently filed copycat suits that rely upon
similar consumer protection statutes and/or common law fraud
actions. In addition to the Florida action, cases are pending in Cali-
fornia,' New Jersey," and Ohio.' In June 2010, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) denied a request to transfer and
consolidate the cases, finding that they all involve statewide class
claims that "will likely not overlap significantly."' The MDL panel
noted that "[b]ecause all plaintiffs are represented by mostly com-
mon counsel and General Mills is the sole defendant, the parties
have every ability to cooperate and minimize the possibilities of du-
plicative discovery and/or inconsistent pretrial rulings."'
The outcome of the Yo-Plus class action litigation may be influ-
enced by The Dannon Company's recent agreement with the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to refrain from making certain health claims
about its Activia brand yogurt after the FTC ruled that Dannon did
not have adequate scientific evidence to support its claims." As part
of the settlement, Dannon agreed to clarify that consumers must eat
three servings a day of Activia (which Dannon markets as a competi-
tor to Yo-Plus) to gain the digestive benefits the company claims the
81. Id. at 697.
82. Johnson v. General Mills, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-00061 (C.D. Cal. filedJan. 14, 2010).
83. Amin v. General Mills, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00305 (D.N.J. filedJan. 19, 2010).
84. Brock v. General Mills, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00060 (N.D. Ohio filedJan. 12, 2010).
85. In Re General Mills, Inc., Yoplus Yogurt Prod. Mktg. and Sales Practices
Litig, 716 F.Supp. 2d 1371 (J.P.M.L. 2010).
86. Id.
87. Timothy Williams, Dannon Settles With F. T. C. Over Some Health Claims, N.Y.
TIMEs (Dec. 16, 2010), at B6.
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yogurt can provide.' The FTC action follows a September 2009
class action settlement in which Dannon agreed to change the mar-
keting and labeling of its Activia products and pay $35 million to
reimburse consumers deceived by the company's claims."
2. Omega-3 Fatty Acids
Two separate lawsuits have challenged statements made by food
companies regarding the health benefits of omega-3 fatty acids.
One of these cases, Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc.,' targets a company
that was the subject of the FDA warning letter action mentioned
above. In February, the FDA sent a warning letter to Diamond
Foods advising the company that the claims it was making about
omega-3 on its shelled walnut packaging were false and misleading;"
in March, the Zeisel putative class action suit was filed. The com-
plaint alleges that Diamond Foods' claims linking consumption of
the omega-3 fatty acids contained in walnuts to improved heart
health and a lower risk of heart disease are false and misleading, and
therefore violate the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act. 9
In September, the case survived a motion to dismiss on grounds that
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempted the state
claims; in doing so, the court cited to the Chavez decision discussed
above."
An earlier-filed state court suit, Aust v. NW Natural Prods., Inc.,"
makes similar claims against a maker of omega-3-enriched gummy
fish. That suit follows on the heels of a 2009 Federal Trade Com-
mission letter that warned the defendant that its labels might be vio-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Complaint, Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. 10-cv-01192, 2010 WL
1459053 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
91. Warning Letter from Roberta Wagner, Dir., Office of Compliance, Ctr. For
Food Safety, FDA, to Michael Mendes, President, Diamond Foods, Inc. (Feb. 22,
2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/Warning
Letters/ucm202825.htm.
92. Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. 10-cv-01192, at 1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3,
2010) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss), available at
http://wrww.foodliabilitylaw.com/uploads/file/Zeisel.pdf The Complaint also alleged
unlawful and fraudulent business practices, false advertising, and unjust enrich-
ment. Id.
93. Id. at 4. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Chavez
case).
94. No. 2:2010cv00496 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County, filed Mar. 23, 2010).
2010] 325
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
lating federal false advertising laws.' As of this writing, the Aust case
is pending in King County Superior Court in Washington State.
B. Allegations of Misleading Nutritional Claims
In addition to health claims cases, recent lawsuits have targeted
companies who have allegedly misled consumers as to the nutri-
tional content of their products, with varying success. In May 2010,
a federal district court in California dismissed a putative class action
against Unilever, the maker of "I Can't Believe It's Not Butter
Spread," which claimed that the company deceived consumers by
labeling its butter substitute as being "made with a blend of nutri-
tious oils" despite containing partially hydrogenated vegetable oil -
a artificial substance that the plaintiffs argued "has no nutritional
value and is known to cause a number of health problems."' The
decision, Rosen v. Unilever United States, Inc., held that while the
plaintiffs' state law claims survived a preemption challenge under
the federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, they did not sur-
vive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." The
court held that the plaintiffs failed to plead with any particularity
both the major premise (that "all constituent oils [in the spread]
must be nutritious in order for the blend to be nutritious") and the
minor premise ("that partially hydrogenated oil is not nutritious")
upon which the suit was based."
Pending litigation filed in early 2010 has also taken aim at mis-
leading fat content claims. In February, plaintiffs represented by the
same attorney filed two separate putative class action lawsuits
against Kellogg Co. and Quaker Oats in California federal district
courts, alleging that the two companies misrepresented the trans fat
content of some of their baked goods. The complaint in Chacanaca
v. Quaker Oats Co. alleges that Quaker Oats advertised its Chewy
Granola Bars as containing zero grams of trans fat when in fact they
contained levels of the artificial fat that made the products "danger-
ous and unfit for human consumption. " The complaints allege vio-
95. Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Adver. Practices, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, to Robert E. Armstrong (Oct. 30, 2009), available at http-//
www.ftc.gov/os/closings/091030northwestclosingletter.pdf.
96. Rosen v. Unilever United States, Inc., No. 09-02563, 2010 WL 4807100, at *1
(N.D. Cal. 2010).
97. Id. at *4
98. Id. at *5-6.
99. Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 10-0502, 2010 WL 4055954 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
326 [VOL. 6:311
UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE
lations of various California consumer protection statutes, as well as
common law unfair competition claims.'" Another suit,
Higginbotham v. Kellogg Co.,' makes similar allegations against Kel-
logg's NutriGrain bars and several brands of cookies."
Consumer plaintiffs have also targeted foods advertised and la-
beled as "low in sodium" or generally "healthy." In March 2010, a
complaint filed in New Jersey federal district court alleged that
Campbell's Soup Co. misrepresented the salt and fat content in its
"Less Sodium" and "Healthy Request" soup brands. The complaint
in Smajlaj v. Campbell Soup Co. claims that the company's "25% Less
Sodium" tomato soup contains 480 mg of sodium per serving - ex-
actly the same amount as the company's regular tomato soup." 3
And it claims that Campbell's advertises its "Healthy Request" soup
line as being "low in fat and cholesterol" when in fact certain varie-
ties of that soup contain more grams of fat per serving than the regu-
lar soup line." The complaint alleges violations of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act, as well as claims for breach of express war-
ranty and unjust enrichment."o
C. Natural Foods Litigation
1. High Fructose Corn Syrup
A New Jersey district court has taken a potentially significant
step toward resolution of the ongoing and seemingly never-ending
litigation battle over whether drinks containing high fructose corn
syrup (HFCS) may include an "all natural" label. Coyle v. Hornell
100. Id.
101. Complaint at 15-17, Higginbotham v. Kellogg Co., No. 10-CV-255 (S.D.Cal.
Feb. 1, 2010).
102. In addition to the suits against Kellogg and Quaker Oats, a New York resi-
dent filed a similar labeling claim in California federal district court in March
against Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, a company that had previously been targeted by
the FDA in its warning letter actions the month before. However, that suit was
dismissed in August after the court held that the plaintiff did not have standing to
bring the claim under California consumer protection laws. Carrea v. Dreyer's
Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10-01044 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) (order granting
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and granting defendant's motion to dismiss).
103. Complaint at 2, Smajlaj v. Campbell Soup Co., No. 1:33-av-00001 (D.N.J.
filed Mar. 12, 2010), available at http://classactionlawsuitsinthenews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/03/Campbell-Tomato-Soup-Class-Action-Complaint.pdf.
104. Id. at 7-8.
105. Id. at 9-10.
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Brewing Co., '" is the latest in a series of cases filed in federal court
that have challenged "all natural" product labels on Snapple bever-
ages and Arizona Iced Tea." The plaintiffs in these cases allege that
"the complicated process used to create HFCS does not occur in
nature and that the molecules in HFCS were not extracted from
natural sources, but instead were created through enzymatically
catalyzed chemical reactions in factories" and therefore cannot be
considered "natural" ingredients.'"
In 1993, the FDA solicited comments from the public on the is-
sue, but ultimately declined to initiate rulemaking procedures to
establish a definition for the term "natural."'" Instead, it decided to
maintain its informal policy of defining a "natural" product as one
in which "nothing artificial or synthetic (including all color additives
regardless of source) has been included in, or has been added to, a
food that would not normally be expected in the food.""' Since that
time, the FDA has taken a case-by-case approach to the certification
of particular ingredients as "natural," and has implemented only one
regulation addressing the issue."' In 2009, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that the FDA's informal guidance on the term
"natural" was insufficient to accord the definition the weight of fed-
eral law and therefore did not preempt state law mislabeling
claims."
That preemption ruling by the Third Circuit allowed cases like
Coyle - which are based primarily on state consumer protection stat-
utes and common law fraud claims - to continue. In Coyle, however,
the defendants asked the district court to dismiss the action pursu-
106. No. 08-02797, 2010 WL 2539386 (D.N.J. 2010).
107. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d. Cir. 2009) (holding that
FDA's guidance on the term "natural" did not carry the force of federal law and
therefore did not preempt state claims under consumer protection statutes and the
common law); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742, 2010 WL
3119452 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying plaintiffs' motion to certify a class without ad-
dressing preemption issues); Covington v. Hornell Brewing Co., et al., No. 08-21894
(S.D. Fla. June 6, 2010) (order dismissing case with prejudice) (dismissing putative
class action suit); Von Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066
(E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that FDA's guidance on the term "natural" did not carry
the force of federal law and therefore did not preempt state claims under consumer
protection statutes and the common law).
108. Von Koenig 713 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
109. Coyle, 2010 WL 2539386 at *2.
110. Id. at *2.
111. Id. at *3.
112. Holk, 575 F.3d at 341-42. See also Von Koenig 713 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (ac-
cepting as persuasive the Holk court's preemption ruling for purposes of an analysis
of the safe harbor exception to California consumer protection laws).
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ant to the abstention doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which is ap-
plicable when "an action that is otherwise within the court's jurisdic-
tion raises some issue of fact that falls within the expertise and ex-
perience of an administrative agency."" The court agreed, noting
that the case satisfied each of the four factors typically used in de-
termining whether the doctrine applies."' First, categorizing HFCS
as a "natural" ingredient involved "technical or policy considera-
tions" within the FDA's particular area of expertise, and the ques-
tion was appropriately within the FDA's discretion."' Second, and
more critically, the court worried that any determination it made as
to the status of HFCS as a "natural" ingredient could be inconsistent
with rulings made by other district courts in the course of other cur-
rently pending HFCS litigation."' The court therefore referred the
question of HFCS as a "natural" ingredient to the FDA and stayed
the action for six months pending a determination.
And so the HFCS saga will continue for now. The administra-
tive review process that the Coyle court used to send its question to
the FDA is discretionary; it directs the FDA Commissioner to "insti-
tute a proceeding to determine whether to issue, amend, or revoke a
regulation or order, or take or refrain from taking any other form of
administrative action..""' The Coyle court, recognizing this, reserved
the right to extend the time period if the FDA indicated it would
resolve the issue, or to terminate the stay and answer the question
itself if the FDA were to decline the referral."'
113. Coyle at *3 (citing Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993)).
114. The factors are:
(1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional expertise of
judges or whether it involves technical or policy considerations within the
agency's particular area of expertise;
(2) whether the question at issue is particularly within the agency's discre-
tion;
(3) whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings;
(4) whether a prior application to the agency has been made. Id.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *4.
117. 21 C.F.R. § 10.25 (2010). See also Coyle at *4, FN 6.
118. Coyle at *5. As this article went to press, the Coyle court lifted the stay and
allowed the case to proceed after the FDA formally notified the court that it would
not provide guidance on the term "natural." Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., No. 08-
2797 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2010). More recently, two other federal district courts have
dismissed with prejudice "all natural" claims against Snapple Beverage Corporation.
See Holk v. Cadbury Schweppes Americas Beverages, No. 07-3018 (D.J.N. Nov. 23,
2010); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07-8742 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011).
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2. Other "Natural" Products
After two years of litigation, Tyson Foods has reached a settle-
ment in a lawsuit which claimed that the company had falsely la-
beled its chickens as "raised without antibiotics."".. The proposed
settlement, filed in January 2010, sets aside $5 million for a multi-
tiered plaintiff class: up to $50 in recovery for consumers who can
provide a receipt of purchase, up to $10 in recovery for plaintiffs
who can estimate how much they spent, and a $5 coupon for those
who simply claim to have purchased the mislabeled chickens.'o A
company spokesperson said that Tyson believes it "acted appropri-
ately" with regard to its "Raised Without Antibiotics" labeling initia-
tive, but felt it prudent to "resolve this legal matter and move on."'
D. Country-of-Origin Labeling
There have been several significant developments in county-of-
origin labeling (COOL) litigation since the Spring 2009 Update -
the most significant of which is a Washington federal district court's
rejection in February 2010 of a challenge to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's final COOL regulations. In Easterday Ranches v. USDA,
a beef processing company that frequently imports Canadian cattle
into the U.S. for slaughter argued that the USDA's COOL rules
impermissibly conflicted with prior country-of-origin rules issued by
the Treasury Department.'2 ' The district court disagreed, holding
119. In Re Tyson Foods Inc., Chicken Raised Without Antibiotics Consumer
Litig., No. RDB-08-1982 (D. Md. May 11, 2010) (memorandum opinion and order
granting settlement).
120. Ben Nuckols, Settlement Over Tyson's No-Antibiotics Claim Offered, TULSA
WORLD, Jan. 15, 2010, http-//www.tulsaworld.com/business/article.aspx?subjectid=
47&articleid=20100115_47 E6_BALTIM861949&rss Ink=5.
121. Id.
122. See A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Pasteurized Almonds and
Country of Origin Labeling, 5 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 111 (2009).
123. No. cv-08-5067-RHW, 2010 WL 457432 (E.D. Wash. 2010). The Food, Con-
servation and Energy Act of 2008 Pub. L. No. 110-234, 132 Stat. 923 (2008) [here-
inafter 2008 Farm Bill], represented a change in country-of-origin labeling require-
ments with respect to cattle imported into the United States for immediate slaugh-
ter. Prior to the 2008 Farm Bill, COOL labeling was regulated by U.S. Treasury
rules, which allowed cattle born and/or raised in Canada or Mexico but exported
to the U.S. for slaughter to be labeled exclusively as products of the United States.
19 C.F.R. § 102.11(a)(3) (2010); 19 C.F.R. § 102.20; see also Easterday Ranches, 2010
WL 457432 at *1. However, the 2008 Farm Bill's COOL provisions require such
cattle to be labeled first as a product of the country in which they were born and/or
raised, and then as a product of the United States. Food, Conservation, and Energy
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that the COOL regulations mandated by the 2008 Farm Bill,12 1
rather than implicitly repealing or conflicting with the Treasury
marking rules,'2 1 "merely [provide] for the labeling of a particular set
of commodities that were previously free from any COOL require-
ments."126
On the consumer action front, plaintiffs seeking to certify a
class action lawsuit against a pet food maker that allegedly misrepre-
sented the country of origin of its products were handed a defeat by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in January 2010. The
plaintiffs in Kennedy v. Natural Balance Pet Foods claimed that dog
and cat food products made by the defendant were mislabeled be-
cause they contained "Made in the USA" labels despite containing
ingredients sourced from China.' The district court denied class
certification and dismissed the action; the court of appeals, in an
unpublished opinion, agreed that the plaintiffs had failed to meet
the commonality and typicality requirements of FRCP 23(a), but also
held that the district court should have remanded the action to state
court rather than dismissing it.'"
Despite the Ninth Circuit's holding in Kennedy, country-of-
origin labeling on pet food will likely continue to be a litigated issue,
especially in the wake of the melamine-tainted pet food scare in
2007 that killed more than 4,000 cats and dogs and led to the largest
pet food recall in history.'"2 The melamine - a non-edible chemical
used to make plastics and fertilizers - was traced back to China-
sourced wheat gluten imported by the U.S. company ChemNutra.
In February, a magistrate judge in Kansas City, Missouri sentenced
the owners of ChemNutra, Stephen S. Miller and Sally Qing Miller,
Act § 11002 (2008) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1638a(a)(2)(C)(2006)); see also Easterday
Ranches, 2010 WL 457432 at *1; Endres, supra note 122, at 115.
124. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act § 11002 (2008).
125. 19 C.F.R. § 102.11.
126. Easterday Ranches, 2010 WL 457432 at *2.
127. Kennedy v. Natural Balance Pet Foods, No. 08-56378 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpub-
lished opinion).
128. Id. at 2-4.
129. See Lisa Wade McCormick, Chemnutra Owners Sentenced for Melamine-Tainted
Pet Food, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Feb. 6, 2010), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/
newsO4/2010/02/chinese formula22.html. See also A. Bryan Endres, United States
Food Law Update: Labeling Controversies, Biotechnology Litigation, and the Safety of
Imported Food, 3. J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 253, 278-80 (2007) (discussing the melamine-
tainted pet food outbreak).
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to three years' probation for their role in the incident."0 The judge
also ordered the Millers and ChemNutra to pay a total of $30,000 in
fines.' The Millers had previously pled guilty to two strict-liability
misdemeanor violations of the FDCA: one count of selling adulter-
ated food and one count of selling misbranded food."' In addition
to the criminal penalties, the Millers and ChemNutra had previously
reached a $24 million civil settlement with owners of pets affected
by the tainted food."3
E. Labeling for the Discerning Consumer: Profit Margin
or Litigation Trap
The tie that binds all of these health claims and mislabeling ac-
tions together is, of course, the desire to stand out in a crowded
food marketplace. Food companies know that consumers increas-
ingly demand healthier foods (Wal-Mart's recent pledge to purchase
more locally grown, sustainable produce is just one example of this
trend);"' they also know that they must differentiate their own
products from the crowded market of "healthy" product choices.
The desire to be different can be generalized across the food prod-
ucts industry: even the marketing of pet food as being "Made in the
USA" is strategically aimed at consumers who would rather not see
Fido's Tender Vittles become a victim of outsourcing and globaliza-
tion. But it is also a matter of profit. A fundamental premise un-
derlying the Yo-Plus, Campbell's Soup, and HFCS beverage litiga-
tion is that the defendant companies allegedly duped consumers
into paying higher prices for "healthy" products that were allegedly
not any healthier than the company's regular product offerings.
Given the relative ease with which a product can be branded and
sold using consistent, easily appealing messaging - for example,
"Healthy Request" soup or yogurt with "good-for-you bacteria" - it is
not surprising to see push back by regulators and consumers seeking
substantiation. So long as the push for healthy food and product
differentiation continues, likely so too will accompanying litigation.
130. Sentencing for Chemnutra Over Misdemeanor Violations in Melamine Litigation,
FIERcEBIOTEcH.cOM (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/press-releases/
sentencing-chemnutra-over-misdemeanor-violations-melamine-litigation.
131. McCormick, supra note 129.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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IV. UNPAID FARM INTERNS: BALANCING THE NEED OF EDUCATION
WITH EMPLOYEE PROTECTION
On March 22, 2010, Washington State Governor Chris Gre-
goire signed into law a bill establishing a pilot program for unpaid
internships on small farms.' The bill is the Washington State legis-
lature's means of addressing the need for beginning farmer training,
while also protecting farm laborers from potential exploitation. For
many years, internships have been a means for beginning farmers to
learn sustainable or organic practices.' In theory, the farmer pro-
vides education and experience that would otherwise be unavailable
to the intern.' Some farms, however, may use the intern more for
grunt work than to provide mentorship,'" a problematic situation
that may create an unfair advantage and compromise wages and
worker protections in the industry as a whole.'" Regardless of how
the farmer and intern perceive the relationship, farmers who take
on unpaid interns may liable for costly labor law violations due to
varying applicability of state and federal labor laws.'o
The use of interns on farms has been garnering attention for
several reasons. First, the practice has been on the rise in recent
years as the local food movement increases demand for products
from small farms and more people from non-farming backgrounds
begin to pursue farming as a career (and experiential education to
135. See Farm Internship Program, 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1084 (codified at
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.12.465, 50.04.237, 51.16.235) (expires Dec. 31, 2011).
136. Organizations such as the National Sustainable Agricultural Information
Service have maintained databases to connect interns to farmers since 1989. Sus-
tainable Farming Internships and Apprenticeships, NAT'L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. INFO.
SERV., http://attra.ncat.org/attra-pub/internships/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
137. DOUG JONES, INTERNSHIPS IN SUSTAINABLE FARMING: A HANDBOOK FOR
FARMERS 2 (Sarah IJohnston ed., 1999).
138. Leslie Cole, Nurturing the Next Crop of Farmers, OREGONLIVE.COM (July 27,
2010, 12:00 AM), http-//www.oregonlive.com/foodday/index.ssf/2010/07/nurt-
uring-the-nextscrop-of far.html.
139. Rob Rogers, Organic Farmers Probed by State Over Free Labor, MARINIJ.COM
(July 3, 2010, 9:21 PM), http://www.marinij.com/ci 15437591?IADID.
140. See, e.g., The Fair Labor Standards Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (e) (2006) (defin-
ing employer and employee); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182.11 (West 2010) (establishing
minimum wage for all industries); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 652.210 (West 2010) (de-
fining employer and employee). But see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-203(3)(F) (2009)
(exempting any "individual employed by an agricultural employer who did not use
more than five hundred (500) man-days of agricultural labor in any calendar quar-
ter of the preceding calendar year" from the definition of employee).
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facilitate the transition)."' There are limited numbers of formal edu-
cational programs that offer instruction on operating a profitable,
sustainable farm."' These programs may also be problematic to the
extent that would-be farmers borrow money for tuition, thus starting
their careers with a debt load that could act as a barrier to acquiring
land and equipment. For the time being, this means interning on a
farm is a desirable means of obtaining necessary experience.
Second, with the economic downturn, the use of unpaid intern-
ships in all sectors has been on the rise,"' and the U.S. Department
of Labor (DOL) recently issued employer guidelines that clarify
when an internship may be unpaid."' Although there is an exception
for some agricultural work,"' this clarification may have alerted state
labor departments to potential violations and generated enforce-
ment actions in California"' and Oregon."'
If the current trend of rising interest in local foods and farming
as a profession continue, issues of obtaining on-farm experiential
education will also continue to rise. Although the shortage of train-
141. See Kim Severson, Many Summer Internships are Going Organic, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/dining/24interns.html?
scp=1&sq=many%20summer%20internships%20are%20going&st-cse ("Katherine L.
Adam, who runs the National Sustainable Agriculture Information Service, ... said
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enthusiastic help, has grown sharply since 2003, according to the [D]epartment [of
Agriculture].").
142. For a listing of for-credit sustainable agricultural programs, see Farming For
Credit Directory, RODALE INSTITUTE, http://www.rodaleinstitute.org/ffc_directory
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010). The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
also publishes a directory that identifies universities and organizations providing
education and training. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING
OPPORTUNITIES IN SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE (19th ed. 2009), available at
http-//www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/edtr/EDTR2009.pdf. The directory lists op-
portunities for training and research to support sustainable agriculture in addition
to information on training in actual farming. Id.
143. Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, April 2,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03intern.html?scp=l&sq=
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ing opportunities for beginning farmers especially is acute in labor-
intensive sustainable systems, it presents a concern for all agricul-
ture as the farming population ages."' In some states, such as Cali-
fornia, unpaid internships are illegal because all employers must pay
workers minimum wage"' and overtime;" they also must invest in
workers' compensation insurance.m' However, there is a provision
for offsetting pay with the costs of room and board-a typical con-
sideration offered to interns."' Other states, such as Illinois' and
Arkansas,' allow agricultural exemptions to the minimum wage
similar to those found in the Fair Labor Standards Act.'5 Although
general advice to always pay minimum wage is useful in guarding
against legal liability,"' such counsel does not account for the variety
of legal rules that may apply and fails to provide farmers with in-
formation on how to navigate the conflicts between their own per-
ceived need (unpaid labor) and desire (pass on knowledge) and the
constraints of the law. State agencies should, at minimum, provide
information on the parameters of state rules.' Ideally, however,
states should consider farm internship laws such as Washington's,
which proactively seek to address the concerns of the various stake-
holders.
Washington's farm internship law requires farmers earning less
than $250,000 to apply for a certificate from the Washington De-
partment of Labor (WA-DOL), demonstrating they have a training
or educational curriculum in place, and have a written agreement
outlining the terms of the internships that is signed by the intern
and filed with WA-DOL." The law is advantageous because it pro-
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158. Farm Internship Program, 2010 WASH. SESs. LAws 1084, supra note 135.
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vides oversight of internships by the DOL, while also enabling and
mandating education. Furthermore, it is a pilot program requiring
the WA-DOL to submit an outcomes report to the legislature in De-
cember, 2011." The data from this report may be useful to other
states considering authorizing farm internship programs.
However, Washington law has a shortcoming in that it fails to
integrate the minimum wage requirements and exemptions estab-
lished by federal law, which could result in inadvertent non-
compliance. Under federal law, employers must pay minimum wage
unless exempt;' an agricultural employer is exempt from minimum
wage requirements if he or she employed agricultural workers for
fewer than 500 man days per quarter in the preceding year.' Be-
cause the Washington law imposes different standards than federal
law (i.e., less than $250,000 in sales vs. 500 man days per quarter),
farmers who follow the Washington program's requirements may
nonetheless be in violation of federal law.
Nonetheless, this legislation is a valuable first step towards ad-
dressing a serious barrier to development of regional food systems.
Even as formal programs increase, on-farm training likely will always
remain an important learning opportunity, and many formal educa-
tional programs require an internship. Therefore, future legislation
needs to address how to balance the training requirements for be-
ginning farmers against demands of fairness and calls for employee
wage and working condition protections.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Consumer demand for a healthier and more transparent food
system continues to expand thereby raising a variety of legal issues
from employment of unpaid interns to work on small-scale farms for
experiential learning purposes to increased complexity and sophisti-
cation in both required and voluntary labeling claims on products.
Federal chain restaurant menu labeling requirements, litigation sur-
rounding false health claims, and other allegations of mislabeling
demonstrate the intensity of shifting food preferences and stake-
holder's struggles to balance consumer demand and market posi-
tioning within legal limits. Finally, an important development to
track, in light of multiple courts upholding the California animal
welfare and labeling laws, discussed above, will be the willingness of
159. Id.
160. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6)(a) (2006).
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other states to experiment with a wide variety of food labeling
and/or production requirements to satisfy their constituent's social,
environmental and economic preferences. Although an exciting
development from the consumer perspective, the resulting patch-
work of rules created via the legal laboratory know as California and
other states with strong consumer-protection laws could place a sig-
nificant burden on firms with multi-state operations seeking to push
the creative limits of food labels.

